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Oregon's Contribution to the National
Movement Toward Universal Health Insurancet
Michael J. Garland"
The American community soon will complete its slow march toward
universal health insurance, which began before World War I with debates
about "compulsory insurance" for workers.' Back in 1935, when the United
States annually spent under $30 per person on health care, the overall U.S.
health-care budget accounted for only 4.1 % of the Gross National Product
(GNP).2 As of 1940, hospital insurance still covered less than 10% of the U.S.
population.' Today, the health-care backdrop looks markedly different. Ap-
proximately 85% of our nation's citizens now have some form of third-party
assistance (public or private) to help pay for medical goods and services.
National per capita spending on health care approaches $3100 per year; the
1992 health-care budget likely will exceed $800 billion, approximating 13%
of the GNP.5
We cannot sustain this spiralling trend much longer. Other domestic
priorities increasingly compete with health care for our nation's scarce eco-
nomic resources. Families increasingly worry that an unexpected illness will
send them straight to the poorhouse. Voters-and politicians-increasingly talk
about the need for "change". Nevertheless, the road to universal health
insurance leads across difficult terrain. Here, on the last stretch, we not only
must expand access for those now left out, but we also must find a way to
lower the overall growth rate of our health-care system.
Whether ten years from now we will have a single-payer system or a fully
coordinated system of multiple payers is not clear; but new calls to "get back
on the road" sound with increasing frequency. A range of typical proposals-
t Editor's Note: In early August 1992, the Department of Health and Human Services rejected
Oregon's request for waiver from federal Medicaid requirements. See Robert Pear, Plan to Ration Health
Care Is Rejected by Government, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1992, at A8. See also POSTSCRIPr infra p. 429,
for a discussion of these developments. Despite the adverse effect of this rejection on the Oregon Plan,
this article adds to the national health-care debate by describing one state's attempt to reform its health-care
system. Oregon's experience should prove particularly helpful to state and national policy makers as they
attempt to develop viable health-care reform.
tt Co-founder, Oregon Health Decisions; Associate Professor, Department of Public Health and
Preventive Medicine and Associate Director, Center for Ethics in Health Care, Oregon Health Sciences
University.
1. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 243-57 (1982).
2. ODIN W. ANDERSON, HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: A GRoWTH ENTERPRISE SINCE
1845 134 (1985).
3. Id. at 108.
4. James S. Todd et al., Health Access America-Strengthening the U.S. Health Care System, 265
JAMA 2503, 2503 (1991).
5. Sally T. Sonnefeld et al., Projections of National Health Expenditures Through The Year 2000,
13 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 16 (1991).
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each including the goal of universal access to some form of third-party assis-
tance-will be discussed below.6 The proposals differ on the particulars: how
many payers will run the system's financial administration; who must contrib-
ute financially to the system (e.g., employers, workers, or taxpayers); and
which equity system shall be used to ensure coverage for the poor and near-
poor. Yet these details tend to overshadow another salient issue: what should
be the content of the "basic-benefits" package to which everyone will have
guaranteed access? A "black box" thus lies at the center of every current
proposal.
Which benefits and services should the universal guarantee cover and what
role can the general public's values play in determining the guarantee's con-
tent? What role should technical experts play in identifying the services that
best serve the community's conception of health care as one component of its
overall common good?
I begin this Article by summarizing the current system employed in Oregon
to build benefit packages around prioritized health services. I then explore this
system's lessons for national reformers, who soon must define the "basic bene-
fits" that will form the core of any universal guarantee. I conclude by relating
this impending challenge to the recommendations of the 1983 President's
Commission report, which advocated using equitable access to "adequate"
health care as a moral standard.7 Even if Oregon's experience cannot shed
direct light on the national "black box" of basic health care, it can better
illuminate the last leg of the journey toward national health-care reform.
I. OREGON'S PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING HEALTH SERVICE PRIORITIES8
Oregon currently is testing a democratic decision-making model as part of
the state's effort to develop sensible health-care coverage for uninsured Orego-
nians. Many Americans have come to know the Oregon plan by the popular
and professional debates portrayed in the media. Elsewhere I have described
the plan's methodology in relation to principal attacks on its justice or fair-
6. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
7. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 1 (1983) [hereinafter
SECURING ACCESS].
8. The primary documentation of the Oregon Plan is found in OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMM'N,
PRIORITIZATIONOF HEALTH SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (1991) [hereinaf-
ter PRIORITIZATION]. A copy of Prioritization may be obtained from the Office of Medical Assistance Pro-
grams, Department of Human Resources, 203 Public Service Building, Salem, Oregon 97310, (503) 378-
2263.
Vol. 10:409, 1992
Light on the Black Box of Basic Health Care
ness.9 Opponents of the plan primarily argue against its exclusive focus on
programs for the poor.'" For example, Norman Daniels contends that justice
cannot be served unless limitations on health services apply to everyone, not
only to the poor." Others have asserted that the Oregon Plan actually will
improve the lives of the poor (and thus serves justice) even though perfect
parity would require that prioritization be used to define a basic minimum
standard for everyone. 2 I will argue that by opening the "black box" of basic
health care and defining its contents-through a process sensitive to both public
values and expert opinion-we will move one step closer toward the march's
finish line, where all Americans will have genuine access to fundamental
medical care.
A. Overview of the Oregon Plan
The Oregon Plan emerged from open political discussions about options
for allocating collective health-care dollars. The plan employs two principles
highly relevant to the development of a national health-care guarantee: (1) we
should prefer explicit political choice to the hidden rationing that now occurs;
and (2) we should base decisions about what belongs in the universal guarantee
on both expert data and community values.
The plan comprises a trio of laws passed in 1989, which seek to bring
every Oregonian into the security of third-party coverage. 3 One statute ad-
dresses Medicaid reform, the second creates new employer incentives for
health insurance purchase, and the third provides funding for a high-risk
insurance pool coordinated by state government. The plan principally aims to
bring relief to more than 450,000 Oregon citizens who now lack health insur-
ance, the majority of whom are employed but do not receive health insurance
9. See Michael J. Garland & Romana Hasnain, Community Responsibility and the Development of
Oregon's Health Care Priorities, 9 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS 181 (1990) (discussing issues of practical and
theoretical ethics, in particular, the issue of community responsibility); see also Michael J. Garland,
Rationing in Public: Oregon's Priority Setting Methodology, in RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE:
THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 37, 50-57 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., 1992) (discussing justice
and common good issues when viewing the Oregon Plan as a form of rationing); Michael J. Garland,
Justice, Politics and Community: Expanding Access and Rationing Health Services in Oregon, 19 L. MED.
& HEALTH CARE 67 (1992) (discussing, among other things, fairness-in-allocation issues). Part of the
present article is a revision of material published in these previous articles also describing the Oregon Plan.
10. See Norman Daniels, Is the Oregon Rationing Plan Fair?, 265 JAMA 2232 (1991). Daniels
provides the most carefully articulated version of the justice arguments against the Oregon Plan. His
criticism goes beyond that of requiring that all bear the burden of rationing; he also discusses several
criticisms of the rationing process.
11. Id. at 2234.
12. See, e.g., Leonard M. Fleck, The Oregon Medicaid Experiment: Is It Just Enough?, 9 BUS. &
PROF. ETHIcs 201 (1990); David M. Eddy, Oregon's Plan, Should It Be Approved?, 266 JAMA 2439
(1991).
13. Garland & Hasnain, supra note 9, at 185.
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as part of their employment benefit package. 14 The plan's cornerstone is a
prioritized list of health services that serves as the basis for determining the
basic benefits to which Medicaid clients and those insured through new small-
business plans will be entitled."
The political methodology of the Oregon Plan creates a four-step division
of labor: (1) a public commission, the Health Services Commission (HSC)
generates a priority list of health services; (2) legislators use the list to deter-
mine budget allocations for publicly financed health-care programs; (3) agen-
cies plan for and administer services within budget constraints; (4) agencies
and community providers effect the delivery of services in the community and
cooperate in evaluating the impact of the new service arrangements on public
health.
Priority-setting rests on principles derived from a decision-analysis tech-
nique widely used in business-sector and public-sector decision-making. This
technique calls for separating fact-based technical information from value
judgments in preparation for a rational evaluation of the relative worth of
different options. The decision-analysis technique breaks complex problems
into smaller, more manageable ones, focuses attention on the justifications for
"bottom-line" decisions, and assigns parties with varying expertise appropriate
roles in the decision process. 6 The HSC recognized that its mission required
blending community values with the best available technical data about the
effectiveness of medical services. Consequently, the Commission accomplished
its task through six steps: (1) it inquired into community values relevant to
setting priorities for allocating health-care resources through survey, public
hearings, and structured community meetings; (2) it consulted multiple panels
of health-care providers about probable outcomes of particular health services
under specific conditions; (3) it established a system for categorizing health
services; (4) it prioritized the categories using qualitative data from community
meetings, public hearings, and commissioners' informed judgments; (5) it
employed a net benefit formula to rank order services within each category;
(6) it adjusted items within and between categories based on consensus among
commissioners about public health impact, cost of medical treatment, incidence
of the condition, effectiveness of treatment, social cost, cost of non-treatment,
and an agreed upon rule that, when possible, prevention should take priority
over treatment.
Initially, the Health Services Commission developed a list of health-service
priorities based on both community values about health care and technical
14. OFFICE OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, OREGON DEP'T OF HuMAN RESOURCES, WAIVER
APPLICATION OREGON MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 1.2 (1991).
15. Garland & Hasnain, supra note 9, at 185; see also Robert M. Kaplan, A Quality-of-LifeApproach
to Health Resource Allocation, in RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE, supra note 9, at 60, 69-77.
16. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968) (providing an introductory course
in decision-analysis).
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information about the effectiveness of various medical services relative to the
needs of the population to be served. The list is not a once-for-all product.
Rather, it will be revised continuously by the commission and reported bienni-
ally to the legislature. The first prioritized list reached the Governor and
legislature in May 1991.
Upon delivery of the list, the full legislature, using the list and actuarial
data as a decision guide, took up setting the budget. The budget established
the specific benefit package to be offered in full by the new Oregon Medicaid
Program and to be substantially contained in any private health-insurance plan
offered under the aegis of the small business and high-risk insurance programs.
The legislature completed step two at the end of June 1991.
Next, the relevant agencies (Office of Medical Assistance Programs,
Oregon Medical Insurance Pool Board, and High Risk Insurance Pool Govern-
ing Board) received the budget decision creating the benefit package for
Medicaid and associated private insurance packages. As its first essential
administrative task, the Office of Medical Assistance Programs (OMAP)
requested necessary waivers of several federal Medicaid regulations, such as
categorical eligibility and the distinction between mandatory and optional
services. Without approval from the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA), however, the Medicaid portion of the plan cannot be implemented.I"
The waiver request went to HCFA in August 1991 with a response expected
by mid-June 1992.8
At this third step, the agencies also must put in place all the administrative
and evaluative elements necessary to run a complex social program. As part
of this process the agencies use the priority list to guide administrative deci-
sions so that the new programs will consistently represent the values on which
the priorities are based.
At the fourth step, actual implementation of new service programs in the
community occurs. These services will reach all persons at or below 100% of
the Federal Poverty Level (e.g., an income of $964 per month for a family
of three)19 who, under the new service programs, would be declared eligible
for Medicaid. Currently, eligibility for most Medicaid categories hinges on
being well-below 100% of the Federal Poverty Level. Those with incomes
above the cut-off point (unless already included in a Medicaid categorical
17. If Oregon's Medicaid reform program is halted, some other means will need to be discovered to
bring assistance to the 120,000 persons whose incomes fall below the federal poverty guideline, who are
currently uninsured, and who do not meet current state or federal requirements for Medicaid eligibility.
The state would need to find funds to provide coverage at allowed income levels for those categories of
persons identified in federal regulations as potentially eligible. Federal regulations exclude childless men
and women from eligibility as well as adults whose children have reached age eighteen and who are not
attending secondary school on a full-time basis. See OREGON HEALTH PLAN 8 (1992).
18. Administration Says Decision on Oregon Should Come Soon, THE NATION'S HEALTH, May-June
1992, at 28.
19. See Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 5456 (1992).
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program) will be served through either the Oregon Medical Insurance Pool or
the High Risk Insurance Pool. At this step, the ultimate goal-improved access
to basic health care-depends on the ability of agencies to maintain cooperative
relations with direct care providers. If HCFA grants the necessary waivers in
summer 1992, then Oregon will begin phasing in the new Medicaid program
in the fall of 1992.
The division of tasks and responsibilities among the general public, the
commission, the legislature, and specific agencies is an essential and often
overlooked characteristic of the Oregon Plan. This division of labor makes
possible the critically important separation of value considerations from
technical facts at the outset of the priority-setting process. The pursuit of value
articulation from the community uses democratic processes that promote a
sense of community responsibility for the fairness and common-good dimen-
sions of collectively-financed health care. The division of tasks further allows
the priority list to be developed as a decision tool relatively free from political
pressures in the legislature (and protects the legislature from the temptation
to fiddle with the list at the request of special interest lobbyists). The lobby-
ists-representing organizations such as provider groups or specific disease-
oriented associations like those for cancer, transplantation or Alzheimer's-
often testify in absolute terms that their group's constituents must receive
funding without giving regard to the needs of any other groups.
II. PRIORITIZATION
A. Structure of the Priority List
The Health Services Commission began its work in September 1989.
Although the law required the Commission to produce a priority list it did not
prescribe a method for accomplishing the task. Some early critics asserted that
the task of setting health-services priorities is so complex that only nonsense
could be produced in the short time frame and with the methods the HSC first
tried.20 Conscious of their role as social innovators, the Health Services
Commission listened to its critics and kept refining its methods and revising
its deadlines until it was sufficiently satisfied that the list, despite its imperfec-
tions, reasonably and suitably fulfilled its intended purpose. The final list,
along with an actuarial estimate of the per capita costs of implementing it,2
reached the legislature in May 1991. The content and ordering of the list
20. See, e.g., William B. Schwartz & Henry J. Aaron, The Achilles Heel of Health Care Rationing,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1990, at A17.
21. PRIOzITIZATION, supra note 8, app. I at exec. summ. 3. Appendix I contains the full actuarial
report from Coopers & Lybrand.
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remains the responsibility of the HSC; legislators may not alter the ordering.
The entire list contains 709 items, each item comprised of a health condi-
tion or diagnosis paired with a commonly used treatment for the stated condi-
tion or diagnosis. These condition-treatment pairs emerged from standard lists
of diagnoses and medical procedures used for statistical and billing purpos-
es. 22
Preferring to keep the list intuitively accessible (rather than having it appear
as a long laundry list), the commissioners created a system of seventeen
prioritized categories, distributed the condition-treatment pairs among these
categories and, finally (using a net-benefit formula), rank-ordered the items
within each category. Fashioned around values that the commission elicited
from the public through forty-seven community meetings and twelve public
hearings, the categories also reflect the basic priority zones (with category I
representing the highest-priority group of services). Some overlap among
categories exists, because certain items conceptually belong in a given category
but have special characteristics that led the commissioners to place them above
or below their otherwise logical position.
In transmitting the list to the legislature, the commissioners recommended
labelling categories 1 to 9 essential components of basic health care, categories
10 to 13 very important elements of health care, and categories 14 to 17
valuable to individuals (but significantly less likely to be cost-effective or to
produce substantial benefits).'
B. Content of the List24
The following list presents the categories in priority order and provides
examples of the kind of health services grouped within each category.
Essential Components of Basic Health Care
1. Acute fatal conditions for which treatment prevents death and provides
full recovery: e.g., repair of deep open wound of the neck, appendectomy, and
medical therapy for myocarditis.
2. Maternity care, including disorders of the newborn: e.g., obstetrical
care, medical therapy for drug reactions and intoxications specific to newborns,
and medical therapy for low birth weight babies.
3. Acute fatal conditions for which treatment prevents death but for which
recovery is limited: e.g., surgical treatment for head injury with prolonged loss
22. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
23. PRIOR1TIzATION, supra note 8, at 69-71.
24. This section is adapted from id. at app. G, Gl1-G12.
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of consciousness, medical therapy for acute bacterial meningitis, and reduction
of an open fracture of a joint.
4. Preventive care for children: e.g., immunizations, medical therapy for
streptococcal sore throat and scarlet fever, and screening for specific problems
such as vision problems, hearing problems, or anemia.
5. Chronic conditions that are fatal and for which treatment improves life
span and quality of life: e.g., medical therapy for type-I diabetes mellitus,
medical and surgical treatment for treatable cancer of the uterus, and medical
therapy for asthma.
6. Reproductive services: e.g., contraceptive management, vasectomy, and
tubal ligation.
7. Comfort care: e.g., palliative therapy for conditions in which death is
imminent.
8. Preventive dental dare for adults and children: e.g., cleaning and
fluoride treatments.
9. Preventive care of proven efficacy for adults: e.g., mammograms, blood
pressure screening, medical therapy, and chemoprophylaxis for primary
tuberculosis.
Very Important Elements of Health Care
10. Acute nonfatal conditions for which treatment is likely to bring a return
to previous health: e.g., medical therapy for acute thyroiditis, medical therapy
for vaginitis, and restorative dental service for caries.
11. Chronic nonfatal conditions for which a one-time treatment improves
the quality of life: e.g., hip replacement, laser surgery for diabetic retinopathy,
and medical therapy for rheumatic fever.
12. Acute nonfatal conditions for which treatment is unable to fully restore
previous health: e.g., arthroscopic repair of internal derangement of the knee
and repair of corneal laceration.
13. Chronic nonfatal conditions for which repetitive treatment improves
the quality of life: e.g., medical therapy for chronic sinusitis, migraine head-
aches, and psoriasis.
Elements Valuable to Individuals but of Minimal Gain or High Cost
14. Acute conditions that are nonfatal and self-limited for which treatment
expedites recovery: e.g., medical therapy for diaper rash, acute conjunctivitis,
and pharyngitis.
15. Infertility services: e.g., medical therapy for anovulation, microsurgery
for tubal disease, and in-vitro fertilization.
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16. Preventive services of unproven benefit for adults: e.g., dipstick
urinalysis for hematuria in adults less than 60 years of age, sigmoidoscopy for
persons less than 40 years of age, and screening of non-pregnant adults for
type-I diabetes mellitus.
17. Fatal or non-fatal conditions for which treatment provides minimal or
no improvement in quality of life: e.g., fingertip avulsion repair that does not
include fingernail, medical therapy for gallstones without cholecystitis, and
medical therapy for viral warts.
The 1991 Oregon Legislature passed a budget for the new Medicaid
Program that funds health services through line 587, thus providing for virtu-
ally all (98%) of the services in the "essential to basic care" group, most
(82%) of the services in the "very important" group, and a few (7%) of the
services in the "valuable to individuals but of minimal gain and/or high cost"
group.' This funds Medicaid at a higher level than under the old, non-
waivered program. The auxilliary dollars will pay for services rendered to the
additional persons who gain coverage under the new system.
C. Prioritization Method: Exploring Values
The Oregon Plan's method assumes that defining a basic standard for
health-care benefits requires two inputs: an articulation of relevant values from
the community, and relevant technical data from experts. Using public hear-
ings, structured community meetings, and a telephone survey, the HSC
accordingly gathered two kinds of values data: individual values and communi-
ty values.
Individual values data primarily issued from a random sample telephone
survey of the Oregon population, which relied on an instrument adapted from
Kaplan's Quality of Well-Being (QWB) scale.26 These individual value state-
ments provided a scale for weighing the outcomes of health care described in
quality-of-life terms. Six categories of functional impairment (two levels each
of restricted mobility, physical activity, and social activity) and a list of twenty-
three symptoms form the scale.27 The sample represented the Oregon popula-
tion fairly accurately, although women were slightly over-sampled and house-
25. Personal communication with Darren Coffman, Oregon Health Services Commission Staff
Statistician (July 22, 1991). The 2% unfunded "essential" services were probably errors of categorization
that were ultimately demoted by the commissioners. Similarly the few "very important" items that appear
above the funding line were either categorization errors or have a significant public health value that were
ultimately promoted by the commissioners.
26. See Robert M. Kaplan & J.P. Anderson, A General Health Policy Model: Update andApplications,
23 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 203 (1988) (describing a health decision model based on the QWB scale).
27. PRIORITIZATION, supra note 8, at app. C, C7-C8.
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holds below poverty slightly under-sampled.2" The results of the survey
provided the HSC with a set of weighted functional categories and symptoms,
which health-care providers then used to characterize the probable outcomes
of treatments for specific conditions.
Twelve public hearings the Commission held at seven different sites around
the state generated another variety of values information. 29 Those giving
testimony represented either individual interests or special group interests.
Participants made vigorous pleas for preventive services, mental health and
chemical dependency services, universal health insurance, the use of alternative
providers, dental services, prenatal care, health education, and transplant
services. Some spoke to the need for hearing, vision, and nutrition services.
Many used the opportunity to urge the government to alter its general budget-
ary priorities. The HSC considered the public hearings helpful for "understand-
ing the general tone of public needs and concerns" and brought the information
to bear on the process of ranking categories described below.
A third variety of values came from a series of community meetings.
Through this participatory process, Oregon Health Decisions (OHD)30 devel-
oped a unique set of public statements indicating what makes health care a
common good. Participants had been asked to think and express themselves
in the first-person plural (namely as members of a statewide community for
whom health care has a shared value). OHD intended these meetings not only
to generate data, but also to stimulate the sense of community responsibility
for the ethical dimension of health-policy decisions.
Forty-seven community meetings took place throughout the state with a
total of 1048 citizens participating. Each meeting aimed at discovering the local
consensus on community health-care values. The meetings began with interac-
tive, small-group discussions taking stock of individual priorities relating to
nine categories of medical services. Next, each small discussion group identi-
fied principal values for the group as a whole. Finally, a large group discus-
sion produced value themes representing an "authentic message" from the
particular geographic community. OHD staff summarized the reports produced
by these community meetings and delivered them to the HSC.3"
28. Id. at app. C, C3-C4. The survey was conducted under contract by the Survey Research Center
of Oregon State University. Id. at Cl. The over-sampling of women is considered the result of employment
patterns making women more likely to be at home during the calling hours (3 P.M. to 7 P.M.). The under-
sampling of the poor is thought to result from fewer persons below the poverty line having telephones.
Id. at C3. These sampling factors were considered by the Commission and its consultants not to vitiate
the data nor give it a significant bias.
29. Id. at Eat El.
30. Oregon Health Decisions is a non-profit organization existing since 1983 to facilitate public
participation in the development of public policy involving ethical issues in health care. Garland & Hasnain,
supra note 9, at 198.
31. Romana Hasnain & Michael J. Garland, Health Care in Common: Report of the Oregon Health
Decisions Community Meetings Process, in PRIORrrIZATION, supra note 8, at app. F; see also the discussion
of this process in Michael J. Garland & Romana Hasnain, Health Care in Common: Setting Priorities in
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The community meetings feature prominently in the Oregon Plan and they
have played an instrumental role in introducing several important values into
the HSC's deliberation. The values expressed in the community meetings and
the testimony provided at the twelve public hearings specifically have resulted
in: prioritized categories; the structure of the list in the final report; and, most
notably, the high ranking assigned to prevention and community compassion
(comfort care).
D. Ranking the Categories
32
The ranked set of categories has become the HSC's primary mechanism
for establishing priorities among health services. Initially, the Commission
planned to base priorities primarily on a cost-benefit ratio in which it would
take the benefits of a given treatment, subtract the benefits of not treating, and
then divide that figure by the costs of treatment minus the costs of not treat-
ing.33 Several months into the process, however, the ranked set of categories
emerged as the preferred instrument for prioritization. After the categories
were created and rank-ordered, a marginal-benefit ratio index (the previous
cost-benefit ratio without the cost denominator) prioritized individual condition-
treatment pairs within each category.
The ranking process consisted of five steps. First, HCS developed a list
of categories capable of containing all condition-treatment pairs. The list drew
on ideas derived from the community meetings and public hearings, from
commissioners' intuitive habits of thought, and from the literature on health
care. Second, the Commission arranged the community-value themes into three
broad value attributes: value to society (defined as comprising the values of
prevention, benefit to many, impact on society, quality of life impact, personal
responsibility, cost effectiveness, community compassion, and response to
mental health and chemical dependency problems); value to an individual at
risk of needing the service (defined as comprising the values of prevention,
quality of life, ability to function, length of life, personal responsibility, equity,
effectiveness of treatment, personal choice, community compassion, and
Oregon, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (1990) (discussing the community meetings process). The key
values that, according to those participating citizens, should guide the priority setting process are: (1)
concern for preventing death, pain, suffering, and disability; (2) enhancing or recovering meaningful quality
of life and functional capacity in patients including those with mental health or chemical-dependency prob-
lems; (3) cost-effective use of resources for health care, including the probable effectiveness of specific
treatments, the number of persons benefitted, and the impact on society of certain services; (4) equity in
access to services; (5) maintaining personal choice and responsibility for health; (6) assuring compassionate
response when cure is not possible; (7) giving special attention to life-extending interventions.
32. See PRIoRnTIZATION, supra note 8, at 18-22, app. G; see also Harvey D. Klevit et al., Prioritiza-
tion of Health Care Services:A Progress Report by the Oregon Health Services Commission, 151 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 912 (1991).
33. PRIORITIZATION, supra note 8, at D1; see also infra note 37.
Yale Law & Policy Review
response to mental health and chemical dependency problems); and essential
to a basic health-care package (defined as comprising the values of prevention,
benefit to many, quality-of-life impact, cost-effectiveness, and impact on
society).
At the third step, each commissioner gave a unique "perspective weight"
to the attributes by distributing 100 points among them. Thus, Commissioner
A might have given value to society 40 points, value to the individual 20 points
and essential to basic health care 40 points. Keeping the "perspective weight"
constant, the commissioners individually scored each service category on a 1
to 10 scale in terms of the three attributes. For example, Commissioner A
might have scored Maternity Care 9 for value to society, 8 for value to the
individual and 10 for essential to basic health care. Consequently, Commis-
sioner A's rating of Maternity Care would be 920, the sum of the weighted
scores [(40x9) + (20x8) + (40x10)].
At the fourth step, after individually scoring each category, the commis-
sioners engaged in a discussion session to examine the reasons for differences
among them in rating the categories. It became apparent in this discussion that
the commissioners felt obliged to act as "instructed representatives" of the
community; they repeatedly alluded to the community meetings and public
hearings to interpret their scores for one another.34 Finally, after the commis-
sioners exercised the option to alter their scores in response to arguments
brought out in discussion, they rank-ordered the categories by finding the mean
score for each category (the sum of the weighted scores divided by the number
of commissioners).
E. The Role of Technical Experts
Reasonable priorities require reliable facts as well as authentic values.
From fifty-four panels of health-care providers, the HSC solicited outcome-of-
treatment information in order to connect its carefully gathered value informa-
tion to reliable data about the effectiveness of specific health services. Since
treatment occurs in response to a condition, HSC requested the information
in the form of condition-treatment, pairs developed from diagnoses listed in the
ICD-9 (International Classification of Disease) or DSM-III-R (Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), which were linked to procedures listed
in CPT-4 (Current. Physician's Terminology) or ADA (American Dental
Association) codes for treatments."5 Providers would indicate: (1) median age
at onset of diagnosis; (2) probability that the designated treatment would be
used; (3) expected duration of benefits from the treatment; (4) outcome proba-
34. Personal communication with Paige Sipes-Metzler, Executive Director of the Oregon Health
Services Commission (Nov. 14, 1991).
35. PRIORITIZATION, supra note 8, at 10, app. D, D15-D16.
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bilities with and without treatment; and (5) cost to payer with and without
treatment.
Providers next would identify outcomes as Death, Residual Effects (major
symptoms, activity impairments, and mobility restrictions), or Asymptomatic
Cure and determine the probability estimate of each outcome's occurrence
given the condition-treatment pair under consideration. Their responses would
take the form of a reference list comprising twenty-four symptoms and six
measures of activity (two each for mobility, physical activity, and social
activity) taken from the QWB scale. 6
F. Net-benefit Formula
The Commission used the value weights (QWB scale) and the outcomes
data from providers in a net-benefit formula; it considered cost information
only when items in the same category had the same score or when the commis-
sioners had doubts about the reasonableness of an item's location on the
reference list.37 To construct the net-benefit ratio, the commissioners subtract-
ed the numeric value for the probable outcome if a condition were not treated
from the value from the probable outcome of treating it. They expressed all
outcomes in terms of the QWB scale. The expert panels provided the probabili-
ty estimates about outcomes resulting from treatment or nontreatment of
specific conditions."
G. Final Intuitive Adjustments of Individual Items
After using the net-benefit formula to rank-order items within each catego-
ry, the commissioners examined the entire list line-by-line to identify any items
that intuitively seemed "out of place." Commissioners who wanted to move
36. Thus, in the case of medical treatment of heart attack, a provider panel might have estimated that
30% of the untreated persons would die, 30% will have chest pain, 20% will have frequent shortness of
breath and 20% will return to their former state of health within five years. Among treated persons 10%
will die anyway, 30% will have chest pain, 30% will have shortness of breath, and 30% will return to their
previous state of health. Each state has a QWB factor: death is 0, chest pain is .747, shortness of breath
is .682 and good health is 1. Each factor is multiplied by its probability in the treated and untreated groups.
Total value for the untreated group (.5605) when subtracted.from total value for the treated group (.7287)
gives a marginal-benefit index of .1682. These numbers are used to create the "within category" rank of
individual condition-treatment pairs. See id. D at D3-D5.
37. Id. at 23-28, app. D. Since costs of treatment were finally not considered in the formula, its result
' is more properly called a "marginal benefit ratio." The "net-benefit" label is retained for consistency, since
that is the designation used in the HSC's report. A persistent misunderstanding of Oregon's prioritization
process is the belief that a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness ratio was the primary determinant of position
on the list. Although the earliest work with the formula included costs, acquiring reliable data proved so
difficult that the HSC ultimately used costs only to make marginal adjustments in a small number of the
items on the list. Whether inclusion of costs in the prioritization process would improve the technique or
distort its social desirability continues to be a matter of dispute. See,. e.g., Robert Veatch, Should Basic
Care Get Priority? Doubts About Rationing the Oregon Way, 1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 187 (1991).
38. See supra note 36.
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an item on the list were held to a "reasonableness" test, which consisted of
evaluating the public-health impact, the cost of medical treatment, the inci-
dence of the condition, the effectiveness of treatment, social costs, and cost
of non-treatment. Thus, for example, medical therapy for intraventricular and
subarachnoid hemorrhage of the newborn appears at line 687 among the items
in category 17 although its "logical" place is among the items in category 2,
"Maternity and newborn care." Why demote this medical therapy? Because
such treatment generally is unsuccessful in saving the baby's life or in prevent-
ing devastating damage to the baby's brain. The commissioners made such
justifications in open discussion and then collectively reached a final determina-
tion by consensus. Additionally, the following rule guided the proceedings:
that services with a preventive effect should take precedence over items
referring to the same diagnosis in a severe or exacerbated stage.
In summary, the Oregon Plan applies basic democratic principles to the
complex field of health care. It stimulates active participation by the general
citizenry in declaring the values on which new political choices should be
based. It maintains a role for experts in describing the probable outcomes of
specific medical interventions that, in the aggregate, would compose a package
of benefits. It requires of legislators an accountable budget-making process that
finally delivers to human-services agencies the resources necessary to organize
and administer a valued set of health services.
The Oregon prioritization process functions first and foremost as an
instrument for implementing rational budget management of Medicaid and for
defining a basic-benefits package for small-business health insurance programs.
As the United States moves toward a universal health-care guarantee, the need
to define a basic-benefits level on which the guarantee should rest will continue
to grow. The Oregon approach offers an innovative model for involving both
experts and the general public in this task.
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II. PRIORITIZATION AND UNIVERSAL GUARANTEES
New proposals for universal coverage range from government-run health-
insurance systems39 to a variety of mixed public-private systems.' Mixed
public-private proposals fall into three basic types: (1) those requiring compul-
sory, employment-based, private insurance with government insurance for
nonworkers and the poor; (2) those requiring employers either to provide
insurance or to pay into health insurance fund for uninsured workers, nonwork-
ers and the poor ("play or pay"); (3) those requiring use of tax credits and
vouchers to purchase private health insurance."
All of these proposals assume that the new program will define a "basic"
set of health-care benefits which any private insurer or government program
must contain. The following list shows how some popular proposals identify
the requisite content of guaranteed level of health care envisioned by their
authors.
39. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, A National Health Program for the
United States: A Physicians'Proposal, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 102 (1989); Edward R. Roybal, The 'U.S.
HealthAct': ComprehensiveReformfora Caring America, 265 JAMA 2545 (1991); Rashi Fein, The Health
Security Partnership: A Federal-State Universal Insurance and Cost-Containment Program, 265 JAMA
2555 (1991).
40. See, e.g., U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE (PEPPER COMM'N), A
CALL FOR ACTION: FINAL REPORT OF THE PEPPER COMMISSION (1990); Ronald S. Bronow et al., The
Physicians Who Care Plan: Preserving Quality and Equitability in American Medicine, 265 JAMA 2511
(1991); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, HEALTH ACCESS AMERICA: THE AMA PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE, QUALITY HEALTH CARE (1990); Donald 0. Nutter et al., Restructuring Health
Care in the United States, 265 JAMA 2516 (1991); Karen Davis, Expanding Medicare and Employer Plans
to Achieve Universal Health Insurance, 265 JAMA 2525 (1991); Task Force on Long-term Solutions, The
Kansas Employer Coalition on Health, A Framework for Reform of the U.S. Health Care Financing and
Provision System, 265 JAMA 2529 (1991); Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health
Plan for the 1990s (pts. 1 & 2), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29, 94 (1989); John Holahan et al., An American
Approach to Health System Reform, 265 JAMA 2537 (1991) (describing Urban Institute Plan); Stuart M.
Butler, A Tax Reform Strategy to Deal With the Uninsured, 265 JAMA 2541 (1991) (describing Heritage
Foundation Plan); NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COALITION FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, EXCELLENT HEALTH
CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS AT A REASONABLE COST (1991); Fein, supra note 39 (describing Committee
for National Health Insurance plan).
41. Robert J. Blendon & Jennifer N. Edwards, Caring for the Uninsured: Choices for Reform, 265
JAMA 2563 (1991).
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Proposal
Proposals for Guaranteed Health-Care Access
Content Type
of Guarantee
AMA Health Access Minimum Benefits Multiple
(broadly defined by payers (MP)
AMA)
Pepper Adequate Minimum
Commission (PC) Standard MP
(broadly defined by PC)
"Physicians Who Catastrophic Coverage
Care" for major illness MP
(not defined)
Medical Schools Sec- Medically Necessary MP
tion (AMA) Services
Karen Davis Current Medicare
Coverage plus other MP
categories
Kansas Employer Broad, Minimum Plan
Coalition (like HMO Act (1973) or MP
like Medicare)
Enthoven and Kronick Federal Standards MP
Urban Institute Minimum Standards MP
Heritage Foundation Basic Package MP
(federally defined)
U.S. Health (Roybal) Broad Coverage Single payer
Physicians' for Medically Necessary Single payer
National Health Services (each state)
Program (national standards)
Committee for Core Benefits MP
National Health (federally defined) (state option)
Insurance
This list illustrates that those who have recently stepped forward in the
name of universal access to health care employ several different words carry-
ing different assumptions. Debates among supporters and opponents of these
plans tend to focus on the different philosophical visions of government and
private insurance as agents of the transition to a universally guaranteed system
of access. For instance, everyone talks about who will be responsible for
controlling total expenditures in the new system. But few pay attention to the
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task of defining the content of the universal guarantee: to what should we all
have access?
The 1983 report on access to health care produced by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Issues in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research identified the critical social need for such a definition.42
The President's Commission's report made two significant conceptual moves
in the then-languishing debate on "National Health Insurance." First, the
Commission argued that the effort to base health care on some moral or human
right created more problems than it solved, because such a right could neither
be clearly grounded, nor its limits clearly set, nor the correlative duties
appropriately assigned. Second, it introduced two key words into the customary
formula about access to health care: equitable access and adequate care.
"Society has a moral obligation to ensure that everyone has access to adequate
care without being subject to excessive burdens. ""4 The report urged that the
concept of "adequate health care" be used to guide social efforts to create a
package of basic care available to all, nonetheless acknowledging that some
persons may have the resources to privately purchase services in excess of the
basic standard. Equity demands only that an adequate level be available to all,
not that every kind of care be equally available to all. The Commission thus
openly endorsed the concept of a two or many-tier system, provided that the
bottom tier could meet some standard of equity."
The President's Commission pointed to four important health-care goals:
(1) contributing to equality of opportunity in society, (2) reducing pain and
suffering, (3) informing persons about their life prospects, and (4) associating
health care with many central symbols of human existence. 45 The Oregon
approach adds to the array of values pointed to by the President's Commission.
Through its community-meeting process, the Oregon approach evokes a rich
articulation of "what makes health care important to us" and provides a broad
base of values by which to judge the scope of "adequate" health care (the
thirteen value themes discussed above)..'
The President's Commission did not offer a definition of adequate care,
but discussed factors that require consideration: (1) which conditions merit
42. See SECURING ACCESS, supra note 7, at 35-42.
43. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
44. See id. at 35-47.
45. See id. at 16-17. But see NoRMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 81-83 (1985). Daniels argues
for a narrow rationale, maintaining conditions for equality of opportunity, as the basis for claiming a
societal duty to secure access to health care for everyone. The more-narrow rationale, Daniels argues, more
clearly establishes a basis injustice for the social obligation. Daniels contends that other rationales are less
forceful and less likely to sustain a critical perspective on the current structure of the health-care system.
The Oregon approach of asking the community to help define what they believe makes health care a
significant common good is even more broad than the President's Commission four-point basis. I believe
this is a strength rather than a weakness.
46. See infra section I.D.
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guaranteed access to treatment; (2) health conditions in relation to treatment
options; (3) the costs and effectiveness of such treatments; and (4) the quality
of guaranteed treatments. The President's Commission suggested several
approaches to defining adequacy criteria, including relying on professional
judgment, consulting average current use data, and compiling comprehensive
lists of medical services.47 Two caveats run through the President's Commis-
sion's remarks on adequacy. First, care must be taken to keep the definition
dynamic: "adequacy" should not denote an uncritical endorsement of the status
quo. Second, recognizing that the definition of adequate is not objective, the
ultimate source of value determinations should be the public. In sum, "the
appropriate values to be assigned to the consequences of policies must ultimate-
ly be determined by people expressing their values through social and political
processes as well as in the marketplace. 41
One principal equity issue embedded in the concept of adequate care is
fairness. Fairness in a two-tier system rests on the content of the universally
guaranteed level of service. But where will this basic-benefits package come
from? Who will define it? What values will it encompass? By what process
will it be reviewed for adequacy? I believe that it is in answering these ques-
tions that the Oregon Plan reveals its most interesting and nationally-useful
feature.
A concerted effort over time with a broad selection of U.S. citizens could
contribute information useful to the national task of identifying the content of
the much-desired package of guaranteed medical benefits. Shedding light on
the "black box" of basic health care, in turn, would give meaning to the phrase
"equitable access to adequate health care." Since the virtual demise of the
Health Planning Agencies-created in the 1970s to provide a national network
for citizen input into the health-care system-any current national effort along
the lines of the Oregon Plan would require some coalition building among civic
groups such as those that make up American Health Decisions (a coalition of
statewide organizations similar to Oregon Health Decisions), 49 League of
Women Voters, AARP, and the like. A model around which such a nationwide
outreach could be constructed already has been developed by the Public
Agenda Foundation and was first attempted on a large scale in the spring of
1992.50
47. SECURING AccEss, supra note 7, at 37-42.
48. Id. at 37.
49. See Bruce Jennings, A Grassrots Movement in Bioethics-Community Health Decisions, HAsTINGS
CENTER REP., Spec. Supp. June/July 1988, at 1.
50. PUBLIC AGENDA FOUND., CONDITION CRITICAL: THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE FORUM (1992)
(available upon request from Public Agenda Foundation, 6 East 39th Street, Suite 900, New York, New
York 10016). "Conducted in cooperation with the National Issues Forum and TV stations, newspapers,
and educational organizations across the country, Condition Critical is intended to help citizens understand
and take part in the debate on the country's health care system."
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A second equity issue concerns the level of financial burden required of
someone seeking access to adequate care. Most of the current universal-access
proposals pay a great deal of attention to this issue of financial burden, with
regard both to those seeking care and to those called upon to contribute
resources so as to lighten the burden of those in greatest need. Oregon's
community meetings did not shed light on this dimension of equity because
targeting the source of funding for the whole health-care system lay outside
of the Oregon Plan's mandate. There is, however, no reason to believe that
a community meeting process could not illuminate the values underlying
community decisions about how to finance the new system. Indeed, if health-
care reform aims to achieve equity goals (i.e., universal access to "adequate"
care), then clearly-articulated values regarding the moral goals of third-party
financing should guide the development of any fiscal plans.
The greatest challenge facing a search for consensus on the financing issue
is how to keep the discussion from being overwhelmed by deeply-ingrained
feelings about taxes independent of equitable goals. This discussion, though
difficult and sensitive, nonetheless is essential to moving ahead on the march
toward universal health insurance.
III. HEALTH CARE, SOLIDARITY, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The Oregon Plan presumes that the content of a socially-guaranteed "basic-
benefits" package should unfold from an open, democratic process in which
public values and technical expertise play complementary roles. This approach
considers questions of justice and fairness, especially in terms of access to
socially-guaranteed benefits. It also ensures social responsibility for the content
of the common good (the basic health-care package) and promotes fairer
distributions of the burden of sustaining that good.
Most universal-access proposals focus almost exclusively on how to finance
their programs, such that they treat the content of the basic-benefits package
as a near-negligible issue. Currently, public programs within the U.S. health-
care system vary greatly as to basic benefits. Each of the public sector's fifty
different Medicaid programs, Medicare, Veterans Administration, Department
of Defense Medical Programs, the Native American Health Service, and state
and local welfare programs insures a different benefits package. Private
insurance plans likewise vary tremendously in terms of covered services. The
system as a whole tends to define benefits broadly, deferring as much as
possible to professional autonomy. In light of this tremendous variability, all
reform proposals address the need to develop uniform national standards for
benefit packages. Uniformity in the lower tier-the universally guaranteed
tier-is seen as a prerequisite for fairness and equity in the system. To fulfill
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this prerequisite, it will be necessary to say what is and what is not guaranteed
as a basic benefit.
The Oregon approach treats the decision regarding benefit packages not
merely as a technical choice within experts' domain, but rather as a process
encompassing public values and political accountability. Determining adequate
health-care benefits certainly requires some degree of technical expertise. This
determination should not be made without serious input from health-care
experts-both service providers and those who are technically skilled in
organizing and financing the endeavor. Yet the public also should have a role,
since the health-care system aims to serve the public's wants, needs, and
expectations. The Oregon approach further demonstrates that synthesis of
public values and technical knowledge requires a visible point of political
accountability. Dedicating public resources to health care rather than some
other use entails a significant political choice. The Oregon approach seeks to
keep that choice out in the open with its decision-making rationale accessible
to public scrutiny.
In addition to universal access, other major pieces of the national health-
care puzzle include cost containment, quality assurance, and the political
system's capacity to assess the relative value of health care in comparison to
other uses of collective resources. Defining the basic-benefits package using
a public-involving method like Oregon's does not solve these other dimensions
of the national puzzle, but it does establish a frame of reference for approach-
ing them as integrated problems. Cost-containment goals originate from
community values about health care. Efficiency in health care is not an abso-
lute concept, but rather one defined by society's health-care goals. Quality is
not objective, but subjective. The ultimate assessment of quality derives from
the community's sense of acceptable levels of hardship, inconvenience, and
difficulty associated with the pursuit of health and health care.
Political assessment of the relative worth of health care depends largely
on the capacity of community members to make their preferences accessible
to those who manage public resources-both at the legislative and the executive
level. The openness and public-involving nature of the Oregon Plan strives
against the political cynicism and alienation that pervades the United States.
Even if those with political power now behave wrongly, unfairly, or perverse-
ly, our political system will not improve by further isolating politicians from
scrutiny or further decreasing their accountability to the communities they (at
least nominally) serve. In a technologically-complex society such as ours, a
romantic call to populist solutions seems doomed to fail. The system needs
experts. But the experts need to understand the community's values. What the
Oregon approach attempts to do, and in many ways succeeds in doing, is to
create an environment in which experts and the public can work together to
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promote politically-sound, technically-accurate and ethically-defensible collec-
tive decisions regarding the allocation of health care.
As we move into a universal-access system during the next decade, the
need for integrated public and expert involvement in such decision-making will
become even greater. As we seek rational ways to slow the rate of growth in
total health-care expenditures, we also must render the public accountable for
collective financing decisions. As we seek to identify which hardships, incon-
veniences, and difficulties attach to our expectations of quality in health care,
we must strike a balance among professional, individual and collective values.
And as we seek to decide which "other uses" of collective resources we
reasonably might trade for more health care-or which health-care products
we reasonably might forego in return for more of some other collective good-
we must locate the honest priorities of the American public.
As a participating observer of the unfolding Oregon Plan, I have come to
understand that it will forever remain a dangerous and unfinished project.
Dangerous, because collectively financed health-care challenges our sense of
community by making us face the consequences of our solidarity-or lack of
it-in the face of common threats: death, disability, pain, suffering, and loss
of vigor. Unfinished, because, while the source of the threats will change, our
individual and collective fears never will disappear. Consider how the HIV
epidemic has placed new challenges before patients, providers, and policy
makers. Furthermore, underwriting the cost of universal access competes with
private uses of discretionary income. That which promotes the collective health
needs, priorities and values of the American community cannot possibly
promote all the individual health needs, priorities, and values of American
citizens. It simply will be impossible to guarantee access to every new medical
therapy, every new medical technology, and every potentially life-saving drug.
The national march toward universal access to adequate health care thus
will require continuous effort in the face of an unsettling challenge to our sense
of national solidarity. Unfortunately, we citizens of the United States have not
yet determined how we shall measure our solidarity with one another in the
sphere of health care. We will take a critical step when we finally open the
"black box" of basic health care and democratically define what should be the
content of this guarantee from all of us to all of us.
POSTSCRIPT
As this article was going to press, Oregon Governor Barbara Roberts
received a letter dated August 3, 1992 from the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), Louis W. Sullivan, M.D. In that letter,
the Secretary informed Governor Roberts that the waivers necessary to imple-
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ment the Medicaid component of the Oregon Plan could not be given "final
approval until a number of legal issues, which relate primarily to the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act [(ADA)], are resolved." The Secretary invited
Governor Roberts "to submit a revised application which addresses these
concerns" and looked forward "to approving such a demonstration." Because
the waiver refusal was not accompanied by substantive explanations of specific
ways in which the Oregon Plan violated the ADA, Oregon leaders were left
uncertain about what to do to accomplish a successful revision.
On August 26, 1992, a public meeting was held in Oregon at which
Michael J. Astrue, General Counsel for HHS, pointed to the use of telephone
survey data to rank services as the heart of the problem. According to General
Counsel Astrue, the methodology of the telephone survey incorporated a
prohibited process since it asked respondents to rate certain states of life (e.g.,
requiring a wheelchair for mobility, or having difficulty learning) on a scale
of 0 to 100, with 100 representing perfect health. In Astrue's opinion, this
aspect of the ranking methodology was discriminatory in principle, because
it assigned a lower value to the life of a person with a disability as compared
with the life of a healthy person. Astrue stated repeatedly at the meeting that
the data from the telephone survey could not be used in the ranking process
without automatically violating the ADA. Members of the Health Services
Commission disputed whether Astrue adequately understood the ranking
methodology or the impact of the telephone survey data on the ranking process.
Leaders of Oregon's Medicaid agency are preparing to submit a revised
waiver application and have requested from HHS and the Department of Justice
full documentation of the various legal issues. At the August meeting, General
Counsel Astrue indicated that such formal documentation did not yet exist
despite his statements that the waiver denial had been preceded by numerous
internal memoranda. He also assured the Health Services Commission that the
product of their work-the actual prioritized list of health services-was not
objectionable from an ADA perspective, and that by merely eliminating the
telephone survey data without significantly changing the list, the Oregon plan
would, in all likelihood, win waiver approval from HHS. Oregon expects to
resubmit its request for waiver after the November 1992 general elections.
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